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1. INTRODUCTION 
The distribution of consumer goods can be 
characterized as a cycles of activities, performed 
by a number of organizations with the purpose of 
making a product or service available for use or 
consumption. The purpose of the participating 
organizations in the distribution channel can be 
characterized as satisfying demand by supplying 
goods or services at the right place, quantity, 
quality and price, as well as by stimulating de- 
mand through marketing activities of the parti- 
cipants within the distribution channel (e.g., re- 
tailers, wholesalers, sales offices, manufacturers’ 
representatives) (Stern, El-Ansary & Brown, 
1989). 
A distribution channel can be organized in 
different ways. One can make a distinction be- 
tween a one-level channel (e.g. direct marketing) 
and multi-level channels as shown in Figure I .  
Within the multi-level channels there is a dis- 
tinction between three different types of distri- 
bution channels. First the traditional distribution 
channel where the organizations involved with 
the distribution process are fully independent. 
Secondly the cooperation channel in which the 
participating organizations are cooperating with 
each other (strategic alliances) in order to achie- 
ve an optimal individual and distribution channel 
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performance. Thirdly the integrated channel in 
which all activities within the distribution 
channel are performed by one, integrated organi- 
zation. 
This study focusses on the strategic alliances 
of small and medium sized enterprises (e.g. re- 
tailers and retail cooperations) within the coope- 
ration channel. We are especially interested in 
the relationship between the degree of coope- 
ration and the performance of the cooperating 
firms. 
We will therefore discuss the changes in the 
distribution channel, and its effects on the 
distribution functions and distribution perfor- 
mance. In the empirical study, within the distri- 
bution of mens wear in the Netherlands, we 
will focus on the differences between strategic 
alliances within the cooperation channel and 
how these differences affect their performances. 
1.1. Distribution Dynamics 
The growing importance of the integrated 
and the cooperation channel within the distri- 
bution system of consumer goods and services is 
evident. In Table 1 we can see the growing im- 
portance of both distribution channels in The 
Netherlands. 
The dramatic change shown in Table 1, is 
mainly due to changes in the purchasing and 
shopping habits of the consumer. The discre- 
tionary income and the mobility of the consumer 
have grown rapidly in the last decennia. As a 
result of the growing spending power, the con- 
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FIGURE 1 
Different organizational patterns within the distribution channel 
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TABLE 1 
Market shares of the different distribution systems in the Dutch retail trade 
Distribution systems Market share (%) 
1980 1985 1990 1992 
Traditional channel 
Cooperation channel 
Integrated channel 
44 
29 
27 
31 
35 
34 
24 
40 
36 
20 
43 
37 
Total I00 100 100 100 
Source: Center for Retail Research The Netherlands (CRR) and Tilburg University 
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sumer becomes more critical on the performance 
of the retailers. They ask for wider and deeper 
assortments, more shopping convenience (one- 
stop and one-shop shopping) and a much higher 
service performance. Only the most powerful 
organizations, which are financial strong enough 
and have enough professional marketing skills, 
are able to coop with these problems. As a result, 
competition becomes more fierce and can be 
characterized nowadays as a competition be- 
tween several distribution systems (integrated or 
cooperative) in stead of a competition between 
the individual distribution organizations. For 
example the drugs distribution in The Nether- 
lands is dominated by four cooperative (in total 
1.362 retail outlets) and five integrated (in total 
1.301 retail outlets) distribution systems. The 
302 fully independent druggists in the traditional 
distribution channel have a very small market 
share (source CRR, 1993). Strategic alliances are 
competing against each other and against the 
large fully integrated enterprises with different 
store formula’s. Kotler (1 99 1) concludes that the 
new competition in retailing is no longer 
between independent business units but between 
whole systems of centrally programmed net- 
works competing each other to achieve the best 
cost economies and consumer response. 
1.2. Distribution Functions 
Our interest concerns the degree of coopera- 
tion within the strategic alliance in relation to the 
performance of the participants within that alli- 
ance. In a distribution system the activities con- 
cern the distribution functions that have to be 
performed in order to achieve demand-satisfa- 
ction and demand-stimulation. 
According to Clark (Meulenberg, 1989) the 
distribution functions can be classified in three 
main categories: 
A. The exchange functions (Le matching de- 
mand and supply), that has two subfunctions, na- 
mely: (a) Buying: all demand satisfying acti- 
vities concerning the width and depth of the 
assortment as well as the actual buying of the 
individual articles; (b) Marketing and selling: all 
demand stimulating activities. 
B. The physical distribution functions. These 
activities, mainly transport and storage, are per- 
formed in order to get the right product available 
for consumption at the right moment, place, and 
quantity. 
C. The supporting functions for function -A- 
and -B-, such as finance, market research 
etcetera. 
Clark regards matching demand and supply as 
well as the physical distribution of goods as two 
separate yet closely related parts in the distri- 
bution of consumer goods. The exchange fun- 
ction comprises the demand-stimulating and de- 
mand-satisfying tasks in the distribution chain. 
The logistic function comprises the propulsion of 
physical goods-flow in the distribution channel 
and - from this point of view - supports the ex- 
change function. 
The enterprises in the integrated channel and 
the strategic alliances in the cooperation channel 
express the exchange function into a commercial 
policy, the store formula. The store formula pro- 
vides the distinctive quality with regard to rival 
strategic alliances andor  enterprises. The store 
formula consists of a number of policy variables 
which constitute the retailing-mix. Six types of 
policy variables are distinguished (Stern & El 
Ansary, 1991): ( 1 )  product range policy; invol- 
ving policy decisions relating to the width and 
depth of the product range; defining the com- 
position of the core product range and the mar- 
ginal product range, the brands and the pack- 
aging; (2) store location policy; particularly 
involving decisions in terms of number of 
outlets, their location and size; (3) display po- 
licy; involving decisions in terms of store exte- 
rior and store interior, sales system, store layout, 
display of goods, routing etc.; (4) human re- 
source policy; mainly relating to decisions in 
terms of quality and quantity of work force; (5) 
communication policy; relating to the composi- 
tion of the communication mix, target definition 
and allocation of budget to various communi- 
cation-mix instruments, and the utilization of 
media; (6) pricing policy; involving decisions on 
the general price level, margins, price-setting 
methods and pricing policy in respect of compe- 
titors. 
The success of a strategic alliance in the dis- 
tribution depends on the way the shopping for- 
mula is formulated and executed. In our study 
we focus on the six distribution functions con- 
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cerning the store formula described above, a:; 
they express the differences between various 
strategic alliances in the distribution channel. 
1.3.  The degree of cooperation within the. 
strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances of small or medium sized 
enterprises in the cooperation channel can be 
differentiated in two main forms (cf. also 
Pleijster, Gianotten and Zwaard, 1986): (a:) 
horizontal cooperation: involving cooperation 
between organizations from the same link in the 
distribution chain and, therefore, cooperation 
based on homogeneity; (b) vertical cooperation; 
invoIving cooperation between organizations 
from different, consecutive links in the distribu- 
tion chain and, therefore, cooperation based on 
complementarity. 
Strategic alliances can be seen as networks OF 
organizations. We are interested in distribution 
networks. Distribution networks are characteri - 
sed by a certain cooperation and decision ma- 
king structure aimed at the realization of a cer- 
tain market position. 
According to Hikansson (1 987), a network 
contains three basic elements (Figure 2): 
a. Actors, defined as those who perform acti- 
vities and/or control resources within a certain 
field. Actors can be individuals, a group of per- 
sons, a division within a company, a company, or 
a group of companies. 
b. Activities, that are performed by actors. 
There are two categories of activities: transfor- 
mation activities and transaction activities. 
Transformation activities are carried out within 
the control of one actor and are characterized by 
one resource being improved by the use of other 
resources. Transaction activities link transfor- 
mation activities and create relationships with 
other actors. They serve the exchange function. 
c. Resources, which consists of physical assets 
(machinery , mate r i a 1 s , shops , ware 11 o u s e s 
etcetera), financial assets and human assets 
(labour, knowledge and relationships). 
The network model supposes certain mutual 
relationships between actors within the network. 
These relationships have two dimensions, na- 
mely a social and an economic dimension (Melin 
(1987), Scott (1985) and Boekema & Kamann 
(1989)). The social dimension refers to the 
human relationships within the network, the 
economic dimension refers to the transaction 
relationships. Our study concerns the economic 
relationships. 
Formally the network theory contains ele- 
ments of the market theory and of the organi- 
zation theory. The degree of cooperation deter- 
mines whether market theoretical aspects or 
organizational theoretical aspects are domina- 
ting. Based on the degree of cooperation one can 
make a distinction between three models for 
network-management structures (Szarka, 1989 
p.13, Harrigan, 1983, p.7): 
Supremacy model 
This model is based upon a (quasi) hie- 
rarchically structured relationship pattern and 
permits one participant to dominate (an)other 
participant(s). 
Coordination model 
This model emphasizes the coordination of 
activities between the various participants. Here, 
the network leader is in charge of coordination, 
which is generally based on contracts. The 
participants i n  this model are known as 
coordinating firms and coordinated firms. This 
explains the significant asymmetry between 
network leader (defined as the ((hub firm)) by 
Jarillo, 1988, p. 34) and other participants. The 
utilization o f  coordinated participants is 
primarily based on their expertise in a specific 
domain that might often be essential for the en- 
tire network performance. In this model, rela- 
tionships are interdependent and lead to an 
equilibrium of power between the parties 
involved. 
Cooperation model 
This model illustrates bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation between more or less equal firms. 
Here, cooperation is based on interdependence 
and mutual trust. 
Key variables in these network-management 
models are: (a) the degree of autonomy of the 
participants; (b) their power positions; and (c) 
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FIGURE 2 
A network model 
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the manner in which coordination is implemen- 
ted. 
These factors are inextricably interrelated: 
with an increasing degree of a distributor’s po- 
wer the degree of autonomy in terms of strategy, 
tactics and operations increases and so will the 
ability to implement coordination on an opera- 
tional level. 
Differences between alternative distribution 
networks manifests themselves in a number of 
cooperation characteristics, which may relate to 
(Varadarajan and Rajaratnam, 1986): (a) the in- 
tensity of cooperation in a distribution network; 
e.g. intensive cooperation or less intensive coo- 
peration (respectively defined as ((close working 
relationship)) and ((arms-length relationship)) by 
Varadarajan); (b) the level of cooperation. A dis- 
tinction can be made between the organizational 
level and the functional level. On the organi- 
zational level several organizational functions 
are involved. On the functional level cooperation 
agreements may include a single (organizational) 
function, such as cooperation in R & D, market 
research, marketing, reciprocal promotional 
support etc.; (c) the focus of cooperation in a 
distribution network. Cooperation may include a 
specific product or service, whereas in other 
situations cooperation may include the collective 
marketing of goods or services. In terms of mar- 
keting, cooperating firms may decide to im- 
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TABLE 2 
Network management structures and their cooperation characteristics 
Models of network management structures 
Cooperation characteristics Supremacy Coordination Cooperation 
Intensity of cooperation Intensive t _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  * Extensive 
Functional 4 _-____- -_  * Level of cooperation Organizational 
Unilateral _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  + Focus of cooperation Multilateral 
Actual realization Collective markcting t -- - - - - - - - + Cooperation regarding 
functi ons 
strategy specific marketing 
plement a collective, integrated marketing stra- 
tegy (shop formula), relating to all relevant re- 
tail-mix variables, or firms may decide to restrict 
their cooperation to a specific marketing pro- 
gram for example a collective promotion cam- 
paign; (d) the actual realization of cooperation 
in the functional distribution level of a distribu- 
tion network, as expressed in concrete and obser- 
vable behavior. 
Organizations can be classified in terms of the 
power structure within the network. Cooperation 
between the organizations within a distribution 
network may vary in terms of intensity of coo- 
peration, the level, focus and realization of the 
cooperation. In Table 2 the cooperation chara- 
cteristics are given of the three different models 
of network management structures. 
By realization of these characteristics the 
network structure is actually implemented. For 
example, a hard-franchise agreement in a dis- 
tribution network may, according to the supre-. 
macy model, be described as a long-term agree-. 
ment to cooperate intensively on a whole range: 
of activities such as product range, store loca- 
tion, displays, communication and price, by 
means of a collective, integrated marketing stra- 
tegy on the organizational level. A Cooperation 
model, as the other extreme, may encompass, 
only an ad hoc joint promotion campaign. 
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1.4. Reasons for cooperation within strategic 
alliances 
Within a distribution channel there are certain 
advantages related to cooperation within stra- 
tegic alliances (Arndt (1979), Porter & Fuller 
(1986), Duijnhouwer (1992), Van de Klugt 
( 1  989), Den Hartog & Commandeur (1 990) and 
Yanagida (1992)): (a) Market control on the 
buying market in order to assure the organization 
of the supply of important goods. Horizontal 
cooperation between similar organizations is 
most often done to become powerful on the 
buying market; (b) Market control on the selling 
market: cooperation within a strategic alliance 
creates a more powerful position on the selling 
market (customer market). This enables the stra- 
tegic alliance to realize a strategic market pos- 
ition on the basis of advantages of scale; (c) Re- 
duction of costs and risks: reduction of costs and 
risks resulting from the combination of supple- 
mentary activities within a strategic alliance 
may encompass; e.g. logistics, marketing, mar- 
ket research, and product development; (d) The 
access to knowledge, skills and resources; the 
realization of a strong competitive market posi- 
tion without having substantial knowledge, (mar- 
keting) skills and (marketing) resources is almost 
an utopia for the small and medium sized enter- 
prise in the distribution. The critical mass that is 
needed herefore can be realized by cooperation 
within a strategic alliance. A strategic alliance is 
able to develop and support a competitive shop- 
ping formula by which the individual retailer can 
compete with the integrated chain store orga- 
nizations. 
Cooperation of small and medium sized enter- 
prises in the retail sector may be a good strategic 
alternative for the realization of a strong, compe- 
titive market position (Schreuder, 1989). 
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Whether such a strong competitive position is 
achieved by different strategic alliances of small 
and medium sized enterprises, in c a m  the 
retailers and the retail cooperations within the 
cooperation channel is the main focus of our 
study. Especially the degree of cooperation in re- 
lation to the performance of the cooperating 
firms. To investigate this problem we conducted 
a market survey in the dutch mens wear market. 
All strategic alliances were investigated. 
2.1. Set up of the study 
The research was conducted in two phases: In 
the first phase all managing directors of the 
strategic alliances in the coordination channel 
were interviewed in order to investigate the 
existence of the three models of management 
structure in the mens wear business. 
In the second phase a sample of N=227 re- 
tailers from the different networks were inter- 
viewed on organizational characteristics and 
performances. 
The information from phase one, the mana- 
gers view, will be compared with the retailers 
view from phase two. Finally the influence of 
the network management structure on the retai- 
lers performance both in task functioning and in 
financial measures: profit and turnover, will be 
discussed. 
2 .2 .  Strategic Alliances: identification 
In the first part of the study the managing 
(marketing) directors of all the ( 1  1) strategic 
alliances in the coordination channel of mens 
wear were interviewed. These interviews cove- 
red four cooperation characteristics: the inten- 
sity, the level and the focus of cooperation and 
the realization thereof (see Table 2) .  Special 
attention was given to the distribution functions, 
the retail mix and the shop formula. On the basis 
of these interviews and the information of the 
statutes and other official documents, the diffe- 
rent strategic alliances were classified as one of 
the three management structures. In total there 
are eleven strategic alliances in the coordination 
channel. Four of these strategic alliances had to 
be classified as integrated network and therefore 
could not be classified as one of the three net- 
work models. In interviewing members of these 
networks it became clear that the cooperation 
within the network was not based on voluntarity, 
in fact cooperation was out of the question. The 
network leader was dominating the network. In 
many cases he was the proprietor of most of the 
retail outlets. 
The classification of the other strategic 
alliances according to the network models is as 
follows: (a) two of them can be characterized as 
a supremacy network. The marketing strategy of 
these alliances is based on a shop formula. All 
the participating retailers are using this formula. 
The alliance is supporting the retailers on all 
facets of the shop formula. The cooperation wi- 
thin the two alliances is executed on an organi- 
zational level, and can be classified as intensive, 
focused on the reinforcement of the market po- 
sition of the alliance, by means of a collective, 
integrated marketing strategy; (b) two alliances 
can be characterized as a coordination network. 
Their strategy is focussed on the reinforcement 
of the market position of the individual retailer 
as well as on de market position of the alliance 
as a whole. They offer their members a wide va- 
riety of services concerning almost all the 
entrepreneurial tasks. They even develop retail 
and shop formula’s for there members. These 
formula’s can be used on the basis of volunta- 
riness. The cooperation within these two allian- 
ces is executed on an organizational and functio- 
nal level. It can be classified as intensive, focu- 
sed on the market positioning of the individual 
retailer and the alliance, by means of a semi- 
integrated marketing strategy; (c) two alliances 
can be characterized as a cooperation network. 
These two strategic alliances focus on the rein- 
forcement of the market position of the indi- 
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TABLE 3 
Composition of the retailers sample' 
Network-Management-Structure Sample Population 
Supremacy model 72 243 
Coordination model 109 344 
Extensive cooperation model 46 142 
Total 227 729 
vidual retailer. They offer services mainly on the 
buying function as well as limited services on 
the commercial functions of their members. The 
cooperation within the two alliances is executed 
on a functional level. It can be classified as ex- 
tensive, focussed on the market position of the 
individual retailer, by means of a marketing 
function oriented marketing strategy. 
Finally there was one strategic alliance that 
could not be classified because of the recent date 
of its establishment. 
2.3.  Strategic Alliances: sampling 
Classifying the strategic alliances into three 
categories on the basis of factual information 
and management interviews gave us the strata 
for the sampling of the retailers. Retailers from 
each of the three types of strategic alliances were 
randomly drawn. In Table 3 the composition of 
the retailers sample is given. 
The retailers from the different networks were 
interviewed. The interviews focussed on the 
organizational performances and organizational 
characteristics. This creates a possibility for a 
comparison between the different network mo- 
dels on the degree of cooperation; performance 
measures; and organizational characteristics. 
I The sample is representative for the population in 
the retail sector of mens wear: there is no significant 
difference between the composition of the sample and 
the population. 
3. RESULTS 
Our first interest concerns the degree of coo- 
peration within the three different types of 
strategic alliances in the mens wear business. A 
comparison will be made between the retail 
members of the cooperation model, the coor- 
dination model and the supremacy model. This 
analysis makes it possible to compare our fin- 
dings from the interviews of the managing (mar- 
keting) directors of the strategic alliances with 
the results from the retail member interviews; 
Secondly we will make a comparison between 
the different types of strategic alliances on the 
basis of the performances of the member re- 
tailers; 
Thirdly we will analyse the retailers from the 
three types of strategic alliances on their orga- 
nizational characteristics. This provides an in- 
sight in the organizational background of the 
members of the different types of strategic alli- 
ances; Finally we will investigate the combined 
influence of the type of networks, type of retail 
outlet and entrepreneurial behavior on retail per- 
formance. 
3.1. The degree of cooperation 
The degree of cooperation within a strategic 
alliance can be measured by the services offered 
by the strategic alliance. Measuring the intensity 
by which the retailers make use of the offered 
services gives an impression of the degree of 
cooperation within the strategic alliance. 
In general the strategic alliances offer the 
following service package: (1) central payment 
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to suppliers; (2)  order bundlingkentral buying, 
the strategic alliances offer services for bundling 
the individual orders of their members, and are 
able to take care of the buying process (negotia- 
tion, delivery terms, terms of payments) of their 
members; (3) composition of assortment and 
selection of articles, the strategic alliances 
advise their members on the composition of 
their assortment, or even compose the assort- 
ment for their members; (4) stock keeping and 
warehouse facilities, the strategic alliances offer 
their members stock keeping and warehousing 
facilities; (5) presentation and interior shop de- 
coration (house style), the strategic alliances 
advise or formulate directives for their members 
on interior decoration, house style etcetera. They 
even offer production facilities for interior deco- 
ration; (6) collective advertising, the strategic 
alliances offer their members facilities on adver- 
tising. They design collective advertising cam- 
paigns, direct mailings, door-to-door leaflets, 
brochures etcetera; (7) brand names for private 
lable operations, the strategic alliances design 
private lable operations for their members. This 
is done in close harmony with a number of con- 
fectioners. The distribution of the private labels 
is exclusively restricted to the members of the 
strategic alliances; (8) advices on business eco- 
nomics; (9) assistance and advice on automa- 
tion; (1 0 )  legal advise. 
The decision whether to make use of the 
offered services entirely depends on the relation 
between the strategic alliance and the retailers. 
In most cases usage is on a voluntary basis, but 
in some cases the members of the strategic alli- 
ance are forced to make use of the facilities offe- 
red. This is for example the case with some pri- 
vate lable operations. 
The more the members of the strategic allian- 
ce make use of the available services the closer 
the relationship between the strategic alliance 
and their members, and the higher the degree of 
cooperation. An overview of the results concer- 
ning the degree of cooperation is given in Table 
4. The first column in Table 4 gives an indication 
of the overall degree of cooperation. The follo- 
wing columns are showing the degree of 
cooperation within the cooperation model, the 
coordination model and the supremacy model. 
The differences between the three groups are 
analyzed by ANOVA. 
The results stated in Table 4 indicate that the 
strategic alliances that can be characterized by 
the cooperation model actually have the highest 
degree of cooperation, whereas the supremacy 
model has the lowest degree. This is astonishing 
as the results from the interviews of the mana- 
ging directors of the strategic alliances suggested 
quite the opposite. An explanation of the diffe- 
rence can be found in the differences in focus of 
the strategic alliances. The cooperation model 
focusses on the reinforcement of the market po- 
sition of the individual retailer. The service pa- 
ckage they offer is based on this focus. The re- 
tailers within the cooperative model hold the 
same opinion about the focus of their strategic 
alliance. There is no divergence on the strategic 
market orientation between the managing dire- 
ctors of the cooperation model and their mem- 
bers. In the case of the supremacy model there is 
a certain divergence between the managing di- 
rectors and the retail members. They both have a 
different opinion about the strategic goals of the 
alliance. The managing directors are concerned 
about the market position of the strategic allian- 
ce as a whole, and think that the individual 
market position of their members is of a minor 
importance. They think that a good market 
position of the alliance implicates a good market 
position for the retail members. The supremacy 
model is focussing on a collective marketing 
strategy. The problem within the supremacy mo- 
del is that a large part of the retailers do not 
agree with this strategy. The divergent opinions 
about the strategic orientation of the strategic 
alliance causes problems of cooperation. The 
managing directors of the alliance could try to 
force the retail members to cooperate. This 
however may lead to an exodus of retailers who 
probably will join another (competing) strategic 
alliance. 
An illustration of the difference in coope- 
ration between the two most opposite models of 
strategic alliances can be found in the collective 
advertising: within the supremacy model every 
member will have the same campaign, while in 
the cooperation model every member will have 
the same brochure. It may be easier to join a 
cooperate activity when being a member of a 
strategic alliance of the cooperative model. 
In order to get some more insight in the de- 
gree of cooperation a factor analysis is condu- 
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TABLE 4 
The degree of cooperation: usage of the services offered by the strategic alliance (n = 227) 
Service offered Total average 
use (in %) 
intensity of use (in %) 
by strategic alliance 
signif 
coop Coord Supremacy 
N = 4 6  N =  109 N = 72 
1. Central payment 88,l 
2. Order bundling/Central buying 53,7 
3. Assortment/Selection of articles 64,s 
4. Stock KeepingWarehousing 41,4 
5. Presentation/Interior decoration 30,8 
6. Collective advertising 59,O 
7. Use of private labels 27,3 
8. Advice on business economics 53,3 
9. Advice on automation 37,9 
10. Legal advice 26,4 
93,5 
52,2 
76,l 
28,3 
19,68 
78,3 
43,5 
47,E. 
65,:. 
34,8 
89,O 
54,l 
65,l 
57,8 
30,3 
54,l 
24,8 
49,5 
48 
25,7 
83,3 
54,2 
56,9 
25,O 
3 8,9 
54,2 
20,8 
62,5 
31,7 
22,2 
no 
no 
* 
** 
* 
** 
** 
no 
** 
no 
Average use of the services 48,3 53,s' 49,8 45,O ** 
~~ 
Legend: ** = significance, difference P<0,05; * = indicative, difference p<O,IO 
cted on the service package of the strategic alli- 
ances. Factor analysis gives the opportunity to 
determine the basic elements for cooperation. An 
overview of the results from the factor analysis 
on the service package is given in Table 5 .  
The four factor solution explains 69,4% of the 
total variance. Factor 1 can be interpreted as the 
traditional collective buying and selling function 
of the cooperation: all four high loading varia- 
bles express this traditional function. Originally 
the strategic alliances in the mens wear business 
were founded in order to give the retailers sup- 
port on the buying function. Soon there after the 
strategic alliances started to develop collective 
advertising campaigns for their members. Factor 
2 represents the advice function of the strategic 
alliances. Factor 3 expresses the usage of private 
labels. Shop presentation and interior decoration 
form the last factor (4). The four factors repre- 
sent the basic entrepreneurial support functions 
of the strategic alliances in relation to their 
members. By computing the factor scores of the 
three types of strategic alliances it is possible to 
compare them. The results of this analysis are 
presented in Table 6 .  
The results from Table 6 indicate that the coo- 
peration model can be characterised by a higher 
than average cooperation on the traditional buy- 
ing and selling function and the advice function. 
A lower than average cooperation is found on 
the shop presentation and interior decoration 
function. The cooperation within the coordina- 
tion model can be characterised by a lower than 
average cooperation on the advice function and 
higher than average on the private lable support. 
The cooperation within the supremacy model 
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TABLE 5 
Factor analysis on the service usage of the strategic alliances 
(loadings on PCA - varimax rotated factors) 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Assortment/Selection of articles 0,82 
Central payment 0,70 
Collective advertising 0,69 
Order bundling/Central buying 0,65 (0,581 
Advice on automation 0,76 
Advice on business economics 0,66 
Legal advice 0,57 (0,551 
Use of private label 0,73 
Stock keeping/Warehousing (0,511 0,69 
Presentatiodhterior decoration 0,88 
R2 total 69,4% 
TABLE 6 
Average entrepreneurial factor scores for the three types of strategic alliances 
Entrepreneurial factors Types of strategic alliances 
Cooperation Coordination Supremacy F-value (2,224 df) 
Traditional buying/Selling function 0,18 0,06 -0,20 2,42 * 
Advice function 0,47 -0,30 0,16 12,45 ** 
Private label 0,o 1 0,2 1 -0,32 6,27 ** 
Interior decoration -0,40 -0,02 0,28 6,78 ** 
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can be characterised by a higher than average 
cooperation on the interior decoration and advice 
function, but a lower than average cooperation 
on the traditional buying and selling functions 
and private lable support. 
The profile of the retailers within the coope- 
ration model is in harmony with the results from 
the interviews with the managing directors of the 
strategic alliances. The same conclusion goes for 
the coordination model. But within the suprema- 
cy model one would aspect a higher score on the 
private lable operations, as well as on the tra- 
ditional buying function. It may well be that the 
character of a free entrepreneur and a network 
that tries to prescribe these entrepreneurs a shop- 
formula leads to conflicting ideas and a reluctan- 
ce to cooperate on all aspects. 
3.2. Differences in performance 
The performance of a strategic alliance can be 
expressed by means of a number of qualitative 
and quantitative measures. Both types of measu- 
rements will be discussed in this section. At firs1 
qualitative aspects and then the quantitative per-, 
formance differences will be discussed. 
3.2.1. Qualitative performance indicators 
The qualitative measures give an indication 01. 
the level of professionalism within the strategic; 
alliance. The qualitative performance includes: 
(a) the degree of automation; (b) the availability 
of in- and external information; (c) the service 
level. 
Table 7 gives an overview of the results of the 
three types of strategic alliances on these quali- 
tative performance measures. ANOVA is used to 
analyse the differences between the three types 
of strategic alliances. 
From Table 7 we may conclude that the retai- 
lers in the cooperation model are performing 
better as far as the degree of automation is con- 
cerned. An explanation for this is the high de- 
gree of cooperation on this aspect within the 
cooperation model (see Table 4). The retailer:; 
from the supremacy model have more internal 
and external information available. This can bt: 
explained by the high level of information ga- 
thering and information distribution within the 
supremacy model. 
3.2.2. Quantitative performances measures 
The quantitative performance measures can be 
divided into two categories, namely the measu- 
res that give an impression of the (average) pro- 
ductivity of the strategic alliance and the 
measures that give an impression of the (ave- 
rage) profitability. In order to obtain this infor- 
mation the complete financial administration, the 
yearbooks, the profit and loss state etc., as con- 
trolled by the accountant, was used to derive the 
necessary performance measures. An overview 
of the performances of the retailers from the 
three different types of strategic alliances is gi- 
ven in Table 8. The differences are again tested 
by using analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The results from Table 8 indicate that the ave- 
rage productivity and the average profitability, as 
expressed in different measures, of the retailers 
within the cooperation model is significantly 
higher: they have a significantly higher labour 
productivity, selling space productivity, labour 
profitability and selling space profitability. This 
indicates a more efficient way of running the en- 
terprise. The significantly higher turnover, gross 
profit and gross profit margin of the retailers wi- 
thin the cooperation model indicates a better per- 
formance on the buying and selling activities. 
The other two strategic alliances do not differ 
very much from one another. 
The first impression is that the strategic alli- 
ances that can be characterised by the coopera- 
tion model have a higher degree of cooperation, 
and do a much better job than the other two 
types of strategic alliances. 
In order to get some more insight in the rea- 
sons why the strategic alliances with the highest 
performance are characterised by a higher degree 
of cooperation, we will first compare the mem- 
bers of the different types of strategic alliances 
on their organizational characteristics. 
3.3.  Organizational Characteristics of the 
strategic alliances 
Information on organizational characteristics 
from each of the retailers was collected. It inclu- 
des labour force characteristics, investment va- 
riables and commercial information. 
An overview of these different organizational 
characteristics is given in Table 9. 
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TABLE 7 
Differences in performance indicators of the three different types of strategic alliances: Qualitative 
indicators (n = 227) 
Performance indicators Strategic Alliance Sign F-test 
Cooperation Coordination Supremacy 
**  Degree of automation 64% 40% 5 1 Yo 
Availability of internal 20% has a lot of 19% has a lot of 38% has a lot of * 
and external informa- information available, information avai- information avai- 
tion 80% little lable, 81% little lable, 62% little 
The service level 66% has a high ser- 5 1 % has a high ser- 62% has a high ser- 
vice performance, vice performance, vice performance, 
34% a low perfor- 49% a low perfor- 38% a low perfor- 
mance mance mance 
no 
Legenda: ** a-value c.05; * a-value <.I0 
There are organizational differences between 
the three different types of strategic alliances. 
Especially the retailers from the cooperation 
model can be characterised as large in compari- 
son with the retailers from the two other groups. 
They have a higher input of labour, higher inves- 
tments, a larger customer base and a larger shop. 
The question arises to what degree the differen- 
ces in performances, as found in Table 8, are a 
function of the differences in organisational cha- 
racteristics and entrepreneurial behavior or cau- 
sed by differences in type of strategic alliance. 
3.4. Strategic alliances performance diffe- 
rences 
In order to estimate the influence of retail 
characteristics, entrepreneurial cooperative 
behavior and type of strategic alliance on the 
performance of the 227 retailers, regression ana- 
lyses are used. 
The results of these regression analysis are 
given in Table 10. 
In Table 10 the results of 8 regression analy- 
ses are given. For each of the three types of stra- 
tegic alliances separately a regression analysis of 
retail characteristics on gross profit and on gross 
turnover is performed. Also the results from re- 
gression analyses for all retailers together on 
profit and turnover is given. The first column of 
Table 10 gives the independent variables, the 
predictors, for the regression analyses. They 
include: size of labour force, price level for the 
two main components of the mens wear assort- 
ment: small and large confectionary, the adver- 
tising budget, store size, the total year invest- 
ment as well as the assortment type as expressed 
in the ((top 3 brand))-share. This share expresses 
the degree in which the assortment is focussed 
on just a few brands or has a more diverse com- 
position. These retail characteristics include the 
production factors: store, labour and investments 
as well as the marketing mix elements: price, 
advertising and assortment. Two dummy varia- 
bles D, and D2 are included in the overall ana- 
lyses: D l= l  for the cooperative retailers, D,=l 
for the coordinative retailers and both Dl  and D, 
are zero for the supremacy retailers. (Including 
D3=l for supremacy would lead to an overdeter- 
mined correlation matrix). 
The four behavioral cooperation factors are 
also included. 
Each of the other columns presents the stan- 
dardized b-weights of the independent variables 
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TABLE 8 
Differences in performance of the three types ofstrategic alliances: productivity and profitability 
(n = 227) 
Performance measure Type of Strategic Alliance Sign F-test 
Cooperation Coordination Supremacy 
Productivity 
Turnover per full-time equivalent ,f303.146 
Turnover per labour hour 
Turnover per m2 selling space 
Turnover per mz shop space 
Speed of  turnover 3,3 
Average turnover per outlet 
f 187 
f 6.923 
f 5.030 
f 1.612.49 1 
Profitability 
Gross profit f 686.334 
ross profit margin 41,5 
Gross profit per mz selling space 
Gross profit per full-time equivalent 
Gross profit per full-time equivalent 
f 2.866 
f 12 1.260 
f121.260 
Gross profit per labour hour f 1 6  
~ 
f 272.213 
f 127 
f 5.837 
f4.181 
3,5 
f93  1.674 
f 374.786 
39,s 
f2.321 
f 2.321 
f 107.329 
f 5 1  
- 
f271.819 
f 133 
f 4.050 
3 
f 913.989 
f 5.439 
f 367.485 
39,7 
f2.172 
f2.172 
f108.314 
f 5 4  
~ 
**  
** 
** 
**  
no 
** 
**  
** 
**  
** 
** 
** 
Legenda:f= Dutch guilder ** : p of F-value <.OS 
in explaining gross profit and gross turnover. 
The results show that between 75 and 87 % of 
the variance in profit and turnover can be ex- 
plained by the predictor variables. Not included 
factors such as location of the store, the person 
of the owner, earlier investments etc. could have 
added to the explained variance. Size of the 
store and labour input explain most of the va- 
riance in both profit and turnover. For the 
retailers from a coordination network labour in- 
put explains more than store size the performan- 
ce. For the other retailers store size is the most 
important production factor. Price level has only 
for large confectionary a small, not really signi- 
ficant, positive effect on profit and turnover. 
Assortment differences show no effect. Adver- 
tising has an overall positive effect on profit and 
turnover mainly due to the cooperation retailers. 
May be that their somewhat higher advertising 
expenditures exceed a minimal level above 
which its effect becomes visible. Investments do 
not immediately pay off: only a slight negative 
effect on profit for the higher investing coope- 
ration retailers (-. 12) is found. The difference, 
both in profit and turnover, between the coope- 
ration retailer and the others, D1, is significant. 
So, apart from all the other production factors 
and marketing mix variables, being a member of 
a cooperative strategic alliance effects both turn- 
over and profit positively. 
A higher price level for large confectionary is 
profitable for retailers from a coordination type 
strategic alliance. Using a private lable shows a 
significant positive effect on the turnover of the 
supremacy type retailers and a significant better 
profit for coordination type retailers. Making use 
of private lables lead to an increase in perfor- 
mance for retailers within a strategic alliance 
from a coordination or supremacy type. For re- 
tailers from a cooperation strategic alliance type 
private lables do not add to a better financial per- 
formance. 
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TABLE 9 
Orzanizational characteristics: a comparison between types of strategic alliances 
Organizational characteristics Types of strategic alliances 
~~ 
Cooperation Coordination Supremacy Sign 
Labour force variables 
Number of ownersldirectors 1,4 1,3 1,3 no 
Total number of  labour hours per week 183,2 145,6 129,7 
Total number of  labour hours per staff mem- 19,3 17,3 17,s 
ber per week 
* 
** 
* 
Number of full-timers (> 32 hours a week) 4,4 2,3 1,9 
Investiment variables 
Average investiments in the retail outlet 
Average investiment in automation f 5.262 f 7.782 f 6.302 no 
Number of retailers that invested in the lO,8% 22,OYo 16,7% no 
store outlet 
Number of retailers that invested in auto- 19,6% 19,3% 2O,8% no 
f 381.200 f 64.750 f 20.500 ** 
Commercial variables 
Average advertising budget f 30.500 f 24.582 f 2 1.446 no 
Number of regular clients 2.485 1.800 1.269 * 
Average m’ selling space 271 m2 200 m’ 202 m2 no 
Average age of the enterprise 40 44 40 no 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this contribution the results are presented of 
an empirical study amongst retailers, members 
of different types of strategic alliances in mens 
wear in the Netherlands. It is found that the 
actual cooperation in strategic alliances is 
different from the official stated and intended 
cooperation. The information of network leaders 
is in contrast with actual behavior of the mem- 
bers. Leaders from a supremacy type and of a 
coordination type of strategic alliance expect 
their members to use more services from the 
strategic alliance when compaired with retailers 
associated with a cooperation type of strategic 
alliance. It was suggested that too much coope- 
rative pressure lead to a lesser usage of coopera- 
tive services. The three types of strategic alli- 
ances show differences in profit and turnover: 
the retailers from a cooperative type of strategic 
alliance have a higher profit and turnover than 
the others. A somewhat larger shop and a diffe- 
rent shop formula employed by the cooperative 
strategic alliances affects profits positively. 
Private labels seem to have a positive effect on 
profit and turnover for the coordination and su- 
premacy type of retailer. May be the higher price 
margin is responsible for that success. Although 
the private lables within the cooperation networ- 
ks are not really succesful in producing profits, 
the voluntary high level of actual cooperation 
together with a good shop formula affects the 
distribution channel performance. Voluntary coo- 
peration in the distribution looks profitable. 
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ABSTRACT 
Strategic Alliances of SME in the distribution of 
mens wear in the Netherlands have been studied. The 
different SA can be characterized on the basis of the 
degree of control, coordination and cooperation of 
networkleaders and the entrepreneurs, members of 
the SA. A11 Strategic Alliances (N=12) in this industry 
have been studied by interviewing both the 
networkleaders as well as 234 entrepreneurs, members 
of the SA. The study encompasses both the formal 
regulations, entrepreneurial task division and attitudes 
towards cooperation and control as stated by the 
networkleadres and as perceived by the participants of 
the SA’s (the SME’s). By using discriminant analyses 
it is found that one can make a distinction between 
three types of SA’s in this industry. Other results 
indicate that the degree of control and entrepreneurial 
task division between the S A  itself and the 
participating entrepreneurs are differentially perceived. 
The more control by SA networkleaders is exerted the 
less the SME tends to delegate entrepreneurial tasks to 
the SA. The findings suggest an optimal level of E. 
task division and task delegation to be most acceptable 
by SME’s. By comparing (with the use of Anova and 
Multiple Regression analysis) financial and market 
performance measures, derived from the Annual 
financial report, the balance sheet and state of  profits 
and losses, between the SME-members of the different 
types of SA, this optimal level of task division seems 
also to be reflected in the financial and market 
performance measures of the SME’s (Small and 
Medium Sized Enterprises). 
RESUMO 
As alianqas estratkgicas (AE) entre PMEs holan- 
desas do sector da distribuiqlo de vestuirio masculino, 
silo estudadas neste artigo. As diferentes alianqas es- 
tratigicas podem ser caracterizadas corn base no grau 
de controlo, coordenaqlo e cooperaqgo dos lideres das 
redes de distribuiqlo e empresirios, membros das 
AE. Todas as AE (n=12) desta industria foram 
estudadas atravis de entrevistas tanto com OS lideres 
das redes quanto com O S  234 empresarios, membros 
das AE. 0 estudo compreende a regulamentaqlo for- 
mal, divisilo empresarial do trabalho, e atitudes face A 
cooperaqlo e controlo, tal como apresentados pelos 
lideres das redes e percebidos pelos participantes nas 
AE (as PMEs). Recorrendo ti analise discriminante, 
concluiu-se que, nesta industria, podem ser distingui- 
dos tr& tipos de alianqas estratkgicas. Outros resul- 
tados indicam que o grau de controlo e a divislo em- 
presarial do trabalho entre a AE e O S  empresarios parti- 
cipantes, slo percebidos de maneira diferente. Quanto 
maior o controlo pelos lideres das redes das AE, me- 
nos as PMEs tendem a delegar as tarefas empresariais 
a AE. OS resultados obtidos sugerem que um nivel 
6ptimo de divislo das tarefas empresariais e de delega- 
q b  da tarefa, 6 mais facilmente aceite pelas PMEs. 
Comparando (atravks do us0 de ANOVA e de analise 
de regress50 multipla), medidas de desempenho finan- 
ceiro e de mercado, retiradas do relatorio financeiro 
anual, da folha de balanqos, da anhlise de lucros e 
perdas, entre as PMEs integrantes dos diversos tipos 
de AE, este nivel optimo de divislo de tarefas, parece 
tambkm estar reflectido nos indicadores financeiros e 
de mercado das PMEs. 
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